Pittsburgh University School of Law

Scholarship@PITT LAW
Articles

Faculty Publications

2008

Tribunal-Hopping with the Post-Conflict Justice Junkies
Elena Baylis
University of Pittsburgh School of Law, ebaylis@pitt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.pitt.edu/fac_articles
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, International and Area Studies
Commons, International Law Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
Elena Baylis, Tribunal-Hopping with the Post-Conflict Justice Junkies, 10 Oregon Review of International
Law 361 (2008).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.pitt.edu/fac_articles/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship@PITT LAW. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@PITT LAW. For more
information, please contact leers@pitt.edu, shephard@pitt.edu.

ELENA BAYLIS∗

Tribunal-Hopping with the Post-Conflict
Justice Junkies
Who Are the Post-Conflict Justice Junkies?.................... 363
Why Ask What Individual Post-Conflict Justice
Junkies Know? .................................................................... 366
III. Post-Conflict Justice Junkies in Their Natural
Habitats: Institutions and Networks ................................. 370
IV. What Do Post-Conflict Justice Junkies Do?:
Tribunal-Hopping and Work Habits ................................ 371
V.
“Known Knowns”: Six Types of Knowledge and
Their Positive Consequences............................................. 377
VI. “Known Unknowns”: What Post-Conflict Justice
Junkies Don’t Know........................................................... 382
VII. Conclusions.......................................................................... 388
I.
II.

Freetown, Sierra Leone, is only a few hours by plane from the
bustling metropolis of Dakar, Senegal, but it is a totally different
world. It is July 2005, three and a half years after the end of
Sierra Leone’s brutal “blood diamond” conflict. Many of the
buildings in downtown Freetown still sit askew as if struck by an
earthquake. Across the city, homes have been rebuilt as shanties
of tin and U.N. tarp. It is the rainy season, and the air is heavy
with humidity. The roads are scarred with ruts so deep that even
a four-wheel drive vehicle shudders and sways as it strains to
∗ Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law; J.D., Yale Law
School; B.A., University of Oregon. This Article has benefited from presentation at
the Law and Society Annual Meeting in Montreal and at this symposium. Thanks
to Paul Schiff Berman, Mark Drumbl, Sally Merry, and Jane Stromseth for their
comments, advice and encouragement, to Lisl Brunner for her research, and to Hari
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overcome them. At night, there is a darkness so complete on the
unlit streets that to venture out without a flashlight is to risk a
broken leg or worse. Supplies of water and electricity are
unreliable. Malaria and typhoid are rampant. Poverty is
endemic and virtually absolute. The city is swollen with
1
refugees.
The Special Court for Sierra Leone can be found on Jomo
Kenyatta Road near the city center behind barbed wire and
protected by heavily armed U.N. peacekeeping forces. The
courthouse is brand new and was constructed especially for the
Special Court, as indeed was everything else within the
compound’s walls. The court operates as an entity unto itself,
with the courthouse, judges’ chambers, staff offices, a cafeteria,
and even the defendants’ prison all contained inside the
compound. To enter, one must present ID, pass through a metal
detector, put one’s belongings through an x-ray machine, and be
escorted to one’s destination by an employee or guard. The
public is admitted only on days when the court is holding an
open session. In the court, judges, attorneys, administrators, and
other court staff are handling three trials of crimes against
humanity and war crimes against nine Sierra Leonean
defendants designated as those “who bear the greatest
2
responsibility” for the infamous atrocities that occurred there.
Many of these personnel are foreigners: Americans, Brits,
Indians, and others.
Dinner parties are, if not a daily event, frequent enough. On
the balcony of an apartment within a few kilometers of the
courthouse, the hosts are grilling hamburgers while their guests
drink gin and tonics or South African wine. The alcohol and
food has been brought back from trips abroad or purchased at
stores stocked with low-end foreign goods at some substantial
multiple of their ordinary price. There is a lot of shop talk, as
1 This and the following descriptions of Freetown and the Special Court for
Sierra Leone are based on my personal observations during a visit in July 2005. For
a description of the quality of life in Freetown, see also UNITED NATIONS
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORTS, 2007/2008
COUNTRY FACTSHEETS, SIERRA LEONE, available at http://hdrstats.undp.org/
countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_SLE.html.
2 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1(1), available at
http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/scsl-statute.html. A tenth case against Charles
Taylor, the former president of Liberia, has since been convened, albeit in The
Hague. See The Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, No. SCSL-03-01-PT (May
29, 2007), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/taylor.html.
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there will be at such events. Some guests express impatience
with the pace of the trials or with the unsympathetic manner of
the judges toward victims called as witnesses. Some are
concerned about legacy and outreach, two of the aims with
which the court’s registry is tasked and areas in which the Sierra
Leonean court hopes to outdo its predecessors in The Hague
3
and Arusha. There is also talk of the common pastimes of the
group: traveling (to Dakar or South Africa, but not within Sierra
Leone, which is largely inaccessible because of the rain and not
suitable for tourism even in the dry season); collecting
traditional masks (a favorite souvenir); and ascertaining the best
places to obtain good food and drink (in certain stores, at a few
favored restaurants, and from recent arrivals stocked with
personal supplies). And there is gossip. Some of these people
knew each other before, in Kosovo, in The Hague, in East
Timor, or in Cambodia, all hot spots for post-conflict justice
work. Even if not previously acquainted with one another, they
know each other’s friends, acquaintances, and lovers from these
places. The interconnections, new and old, are rife. Instead of
six degrees of separation, in this crowd there are at most two,
and usually less than that. The guests are all relatively junior
personnel, including interns, attorneys, and other court officers
and staff. There are only a handful of people over the age of
forty. There are no Sierra Leoneans present.
I
WHO ARE THE POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE JUNKIES?
Who are these “post-conflict justice junkies,” and what role
do they play in shaping post-conflict justice and legal
development in Sierra Leone and elsewhere? First, some
definition of terms is in order: “internationals” is the word
commonly used in the field to refer to any foreigners working for
4
international organizations. Here, I coin the term “post-conflict
3 To be sure, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are not
predecessors in the strictest sense since they are purely international courts and the
Special Court is a hybrid court. However, they are its predecessors in the
international effort to establish ad hoc tribunals to redress mass atrocities in
particular states.
4 See Kimberley A. Coles, Ambivalent Builders: Europeanization, the Production
of Difference, and Internationals in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 25 POLAR POL. & LEGAL
ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 1, 2 (2002) (using the term also).
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justice junkies” to refer more specifically to internationals who
work on post-conflict justice issues and who maintain an
itinerant lifestyle in pursuit of that work, moving from one postconflict justice hot spot to the next as the previous spot cools
down. It is, at its best, an exciting and challenging field involving
matters of life and death–or at a minimum, great suffering and
long incarceration–for the victims and defendants.
For
international-minded attorneys and others looking for a chance
to make a difference or to do interesting work, this area offers
the opportunity to be involved in the aftermath of some of the
cataclysmic events of our time and to contribute something to
the young juggernaut of international criminal law. Perhaps
post-conflict justice doesn’t offer the same high as heroin or
cocaine, but for the junkies who are hooked on it, it is addictive
nonetheless, particularly when the alternative is the grind of
corporate litigation. Thrill-seeking and a somewhat compulsive
approach to the job are thus essential parts of the post-conflict
justice junkie lifestyle. They are also two of the reasons that I
prefer this moniker to the more understated title of
“international” for this particular subset of the international
community.
Post-conflict justice junkies also tend to be relatively young.
This is at least in part because post-conflict conditions tend to be
rough, in part because the financial compensation is far from
lavish, and in part because post-conflict zones are not
particularly welcoming to families. The post-conflict justice
junkies I met at the Special Court were skewed especially young
because the conditions in Freetown were particularly difficult,
because the tribunal had less funding and offered lower
compensation than some of the others, and because foreign
employees were not permitted to bring their families to this
posting even if they wished to do so.
Within the legal literature on post-conflict justice and legal
reform, there has been a great deal of analysis of processes,
norms, and institutions, but little examination of the people
involved and the roles they play, particularly at the relatively
5
junior level. To be sure, case studies of particular post-conflict
5 See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms and
the “Rule of Law,” 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275 (2003); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling
Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100
YALE L.J. 2537 (1991); Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV.
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settings are peppered with some version of a common critique:
that the involved international actors lack a deep understanding
of the local situation and have accordingly fallen prey to critical
errors in judgment based on cultural, legal, historical, or other
6
misunderstandings. In my experience, this critique is often
accurate, although there are exceptions to be found in any
setting. However, these studies typically jump immediately from
this observation to prescriptions for better understanding
without addressing the fundamental question of what
internationals do and do not know generally–and, as important,
what they can and cannot know in light of the nature of their
7
involvement in these post-conflict states. Nor do these critiques
consider the conclusions that I draw here: (1) that the conditions
that produce this lack of local knowledge are structural, not
situational and (2) that these conditions may also produce other
forms of knowledge that actually contribute to the goals of postconflict justice.
This Article is, thus, an effort to think systematically about an
issue that has heretofore been addressed in a relatively glancing
and situation-specific manner and that has not been identified as
an important subject of inquiry in itself. In so doing, I draw
heavily upon my own observations in Ethiopia, Kosovo, Sierra
Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and build
8
upon my previous articles on related subjects. I focus here on
HUM. RTS. J. 69 (2003). Such issues have, however, long been addressed in
anthropological literature. Indeed, at the moment there seems to be an upsurge of
interest in international law and human rights as a subject of anthropological
inquiry. See, e.g., Iris Jean-Klein & Annelise Riles, Introducing Discipline:
Anthropology and Human Rights Administrations, 28 POLAR POL. & LEGAL
ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 173 (2005); see also THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL (Mark Goodale & Sally
Engle Merry eds., 2007); Annelise Riles, Anthropology, Human Rights, and Legal
Knowledge: in the Iron Cage, 108 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 52 (2006) [hereinafter
Riles, Anthropology].
6 E.g., Brooks, supra note 5, at 2291–93.
7 David Tolbert & Andrew Solomon, United Nations Reform and Supporting the
Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Societies, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 29, 59 (2006).
8 My descriptions and conclusions throughout this Article are based on my
observations over the past six years in post-conflict and what might be called postpost-conflict states (i.e., states that have moved beyond the immediate post-conflict
era and are engaged in a long-term process of post-conflict legal redevelopment),
including Ethiopia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and the DRC. I make particular use
here of my recent research in the DRC and build upon the findings that I present in
a forthcoming article, Elena A. Baylis, Reassessing the Role of International
Criminal Law: Rebuilding National Courts Through Transnational Networks, 50
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two questions carved from the broader issue of the identity and
role of internationals in transitional justice and post-conflict
legal development: (1) What can and do post-conflict justice
junkies know? and (2) How does their knowledge or lack thereof
affect their work on post-conflict justice issues?
II
WHY ASK WHAT INDIVIDUAL POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE
JUNKIES KNOW?
Why focus on these particular questions concerning
individuals and their knowledge? For one thing, I aim to expand
the universe of what we take into account as relevant knowledge
when we assess post-conflict justice processes. Like people,
knowledge is a relatively neglected aspect of post-conflict justice.
Proponents of theories of international law-making such as
transnational legal process and global legal pluralism have long
advocated that the relevant scope of inquiry for understanding
international law-making processes should be relatively
expansive. International law is constructed, they argue, not just
by formal proceedings such as trials or legislative sessions nor
authoritative bodies like courts, but also by a wide range of
informal and ad hoc interactions between actors as disparate as
9
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and trial attorneys.
However, this expansiveness in the definition of law-making
process has not prompted a similar discussion of a need for
expansion in the definition of law-making knowledge. To the
extent that these theories conceive of knowledge in any
particular way at all, it seems to have remained a relatively
narrow category that is essentially synonymous with law itself, or
perhaps with expertise in law and legal theories. Likewise, it
seems to inhere primarily in a limited set of authoritative legal

B.C. L. REV. 1, § II.C.4: Networks of International Organizations, Networks, and
Others [hereinafter Baylis, Reassessing]. To ensure accuracy, I have checked my
descriptions of particular events with others who were present whenever possible.
To protect the privacy of the described individuals, I do not use their names, and I
have made an effort to avoid providing personal details that would permit them to
be readily identified.
9 See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 184
(1996); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1159–
63 (2007).
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10

documents and texts.
I suggest that our understanding of
international law-making processes in the post-conflict justice
setting would benefit from affirmatively recognizing a broader
set of law-making knowledge that encompasses, but is not
limited to, law or legal knowledge as such. This broader set of
law-making knowledge includes other types of knowledge that
are crucial to achieving the aims of post-conflict justice,
including, for example, technical knowledge of relevant skills
and analogical knowledge gleaned from one post-conflict setting
and applied to another.
Annelise Riles characterizes and criticizes the predominant
understanding
of
legal
knowledge
as
“technocratic
instrumentalism.” She points to the modern international law
regime as a particularly salient example of this approach: “U.S.
trained lawyers have promoted a vision of international law as a
set of problem-solving institutions and of legal techniques
11
deployed and managed by international bureaucrats.” I invoke
Riles’ critique here not to propose that we should abandon
instrumentalism, but rather to suggest that this instrumentalism
provides a justification for my claim that we should recognize a
broader set of law-making knowledge. Post-conflict justice is
openly and unashamedly intended to achieve certain extralegal
goals: to end impunity, achieve reconciliation, deter future
perpetrators, produce accountability for victims, and so on. One
12
could contest (and indeed, I have contested in the past)
whether it can in fact achieve those goals, but not whether it is
aimed at them. The instrumentalist nature of post-conflict
justice suggests that we should take a purposive, rather than a
formalist, approach to the construction of law-making
knowledge. Specifically, we should incorporate all forms of
knowledge that help achieve those extralegal aims, just as we
have incorporated into our conception of international lawmaking processes all processes that contribute to the
development of international law.
Furthermore, although scholarly analysis of the development
of international criminal law typically focuses on the role of
10 But see Annelise Riles, Models and Documents: Artifacts of International Legal
Knowledge, 48 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 805 (1999).
11 See Riles, Anthropology, supra note 5, at 59.
12 Baylis, Reassessing, supra note 8, at Introduction & § II.A: Post-Conflict
Congo.
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groups in constructing that law, in my view the individual may
well be the most relevant order of magnitude at which to
understand many post-conflict justice processes. At a minimum,
individual people are an important unit of analysis in this field.
When we invoke the images of “post-conflict justice,” an
“international intervention,” or a “U.N. administration,” there is
a tendency to envision the United Nations moving in as a
monolithic bureaucracy endowed with vast knowledge and
resources, or at least with massive size and shape. This tendency
is reflected and reinforced in the literature (my own writing
included) that refers to the actions of “UNMIK” in Kosovo or
“MONUC” in the DRC, as if the institutions themselves were
14
singular entities that could act independent of human volition.
Such references are both convenient (in that they avoid the
necessity of determining which individual within an institution
undertook an action) and legally accurate (in that institutions
have the authority to undertake binding legal actions and those
actions are understood to be legally tied not to any individual
actor but to the institution). However, they nonetheless distract
us from the reality that it is individual people with individual
experiences and knowledge who arrive, one at a time, into a fully
formed legal-political setting and who react to the needs and
crises of the moment beginning immediately upon their arrival.
These individual people and their individual actions constitute
what the United Nations, and any other involved institutions, are
perceived to do in these settings. It is always true to some
degree, of course, that the individual level matters. All the more
so in chaotic post-conflict settings where domestic bureaucracies
are decimated, and virtually everything is up for grabs. In these
contexts, individual initiative and actions are frequently decisive.
For example, it happened that the arrival in the DRC of a
U.N. officer with immediate expertise in investigation of massive
human rights violations from a previous posting coincided with a
13 Such groups include governments, non-governmental organizations, supragovernmental entities, and increasingly, networks. E.g., Jenia Iontcheva Turner,
Transnational Networks and International Criminal Justice, 105 MICH. L. REV. 985
(2007).
14 Of course, the United Nations is an example of one of the international actors
involved in such interventions, but not the only involved actor. UNMIK is the
acronym for the U.N. Mission In Kosovo, and MONUC is the acronym for the U.N.
Mission in Congo. E.g., Baylis, Reassessing, supra note 8; Elena A. Baylis, Parallel
Courts in Post-Conflict Kosovo, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2007).
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devastating attack on civilians in and around the town of
Mambasa. Attacks on civilians had been occurring throughout
the Congolese conflict, so this problem was not a new one. But
this attack had been particularly horrific–a non-governmental
militia had gone systematically from house to house, raping,
stealing, and at times even cannibalizing at each one in turn–
and so the assault sparked a sense of urgent need for some
accountability. This confluence of need and expertise enabled
the freshly arrived officer to create a new Special Investigations
Unit (SIU) devoted to investigating such atrocities. The
Mambasa attack, know as Effacer le Tableau, became the
nascent unit’s first investigation. The reports generated by that
investigation raised an international outcry and prompted the
Security Council to send additional peacekeepers to the region.
Today, SIU investigators continue to gather information on
massive atrocities in eastern DRC and to provide that
information to national courts and the International Criminal
15
Court for use as evidence in war crimes trials.
This could be described, and indeed is typically described, as
an institutional development: MONUC established a new
16
investigations unit. But it is also accurate, and perhaps more
enlightening, to describe it as a development brought about by
the personal initiative and experience of an individual: a
MONUC officer brought specialized knowledge acquired in
another post-conflict setting to the DRC and applied it to an
urgent local need, enabling the development of an institutional
structure for addressing that need where none existed before. It
is people who develop post-conflict justice processes and
institutions. Who they are and what they know is thus
important, both in shaping the nature of those processes and
institutions and in determining their success.

See Baylis, Reassessing, supra note 8, § II.C.4.
Or, in even more oblique and passive phrasing: “Beginning in December 2002,
the [Human Rights] Section [of MONUC] has been mandated to coordinate and
conduct multi-disciplinary special investigation missions on cases of gross violations
of human rights.” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, HR
Component of the UN Peace Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo,
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/5/rdc.htm.
15
16
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III
POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE JUNKIES IN THEIR NATURAL
HABITATS: INSTITUTIONS AND NETWORKS
Although I posit the individual as a fundamental unit of
analysis, the first and most important thing to know about postconflict justice junkies is that they are not operating on their
17
own. This is true on at least two levels. For one thing, there
are very few cowboys out there going it alone; instead, most
individuals associate themselves with institutions, even if only as
consultants. The reasons are simple: money and power. As for
money, in destroyed post-conflict economies, there is typically
little gainful employment available through the local economy,
so internationals must be employed by institutions to earn a
18
living.
The money for post-conflict reconstruction typically
flows from foreign donors through on-the-ground foreign and
19
international institutions to local partners. Post-conflict justice
junkies operate mostly at the middle level, on-the-ground
foreign and international institutions, because that is their point
of entrée for gainful employment within the post-conflict setting.
As for power, for those interested in influencing and rebuilding
legal systems, a place within an institution with a transitional
17 In spite of my commitment to the individual as the most relevant (or at least a
relevant) unit of analysis in post-conflict justice settings, I must concede that it is
impossible as a researcher concerned with the larger phenomenon of post-conflict
justice to consider the subject individual by individual. However, in light of this
commitment, I return to the individual level whenever possible in my analysis.
Furthermore, I pursue analysis of the group in some part as a proxy for analysis of
individuals rather than as the primary unit of analysis in itself. In this sense, the
group is relevant both as a collection of individuals and also because participation in
the group and its culture to some extent constitutes the individual and his/her
actions.
18 E.g., Toby Poston, The Battle to Rebuild Afghanistan, BBC NEWS, Feb. 26,
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4714116.stm.
19 For example, funds tend to originate with foreign states, supranational entities
like the United Nations or the European Union, or international NGOs. There are
a variety of international institutions on the ground, which are often branches of the
donors, such as the aid branches of foreign embassies, the U.N. missions like
UNMIK and MONUC, and local offices of international NGOs. The final national
and local recipients include governments, local NGOs, and local businesses and
individuals. Tolbert & Solomon, supra note 7, at 55–56; Homi Kharas, Trends and
Issues in Development Aid 15–16 (Wolfensohn Ctr. for Dev. at The Brookings Inst.,
Working Paper No. 1, 2007) (tracking aid flows for development aid generally);
Kristen E. Boon, “Open for Business”: International Financial Institutions, PostConflict Economic Reform, and the Rule of Law, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 513,
522–26, 529, 534–39 (2007).

2008]

Tribunal-Hopping

371

justice mandate gives them the necessary status to pursue their
aims.
The observation that individuals do not act on their own is
also true, however, at another level. As described above, there
20
21
is what amounts to an epistemic community or network of
post-conflict justice junkies that extends across post-conflict
settings. It is a relatively small community. I do not know its
size with any precision, but it is small enough that I have
observed the same people pop up repeatedly in multiple national
and organizational contexts. Thus, post-conflict justice junkies
operate not just within institutions, but also within a network of
other post-conflict justice junkies with whom they are connected,
either directly or at several steps removed, through previous
work in other post-conflict states.
Finally, I should note that the issues addressed here are
relevant beyond post-conflict settings, for the kinds of networks
or epistemic communities that I describe here are not limited to
the post-conflict context. Rather, similar, and in some instances
interrelated, groups and dynamics pervade international
interventions in non-conflict contexts as well. For example,
other scholars have described international NGOs working on
development issues and the work of the U.S. Foreign Service
22
abroad in terms that resonate with my descriptions here.
IV
WHAT DO POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE JUNKIES DO?: TRIBUNALHOPPING AND WORK HABITS
Post-conflict justice junkie networks are formed and
maintained through a practice that I call “tribunal-hopping.” As
20 See Paul Schiff Berman, A Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 YALE J.
INT’L L. 301, 321–28 (2007); Peter M. Haas, Epistemic Communities and
International Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (1992); Janet Koven Levit,
Bottom-Up International Law-Making: Reflections on the New Haven School, 32
YALE J. INT’L L. 393, 408–10 (2007).
21 See Baylis, Reassessing, supra note 8; see also Turner, supra note 13.
22 E.g., Coles, supra note 4; Lauren G. Leve, Between Jesse Helms and Ram
Bahadur: Participation and Empowerment in Women’s Literacy Programming in
Nepal, 24 POLAR POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 108 (2001); Mark
Schuller, Seeing Like a “Failed” NGO: Globalization’s Impact on State and Civil
Society in Haiti, 30 POLAR POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 67 (2007).
Autobiographical accounts by internationals also provide lively descriptions of their
communities. See, e.g., HOWARD SIMPSON, BUSH HAT, BLACK TIE: ADVENTURES
OF A FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER (1998).
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one ad hoc international or hybrid criminal tribunal after
23
another is established, those interested in post-conflict justice
issues hop quickly from one tribunal to the next, following a trail
of new opportunities. They also move between these special
tribunals and other post-conflict settings with opportunities for
post-conflict justice work, like Kosovo, with its substantial
international administration and hybrid atrocity trials, and the
DRC, with a large body of international NGOs and national
atrocity trials. Some post-conflict justice junkies work on trials
at tribunals, but many are involved in other aspects of postconflict justice work: investigating atrocities, promoting
legislation to reform national laws, or training judges, attorneys,
24
and police, for example. Thus, while tribunal-hopping in its
purest form is quite literally the movement from one ad hoc
criminal tribunal to the next, the phenomenon encompasses
movement from one post-conflict setting to another to do work
on post-conflict justice issues, even if not strictly from or to a
tribunal as such.
What are the salient characteristics of “tribunal-hopping” and
of post-conflict justice work that shape post-conflict justice
junkie networks and the knowledge of the individuals that
23 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was
established by U.N. Security Council Resolution 827, S.C. Res. 827 ¶ 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
followed in 1994 under the auspices of U.N. Security Council Resolution 955, S.C.
Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). A number of hybrid courts and
panels have since been created, including the Special Panels for the Prosecution of
Serious Crimes in East Timor under UNTAET Reg. 2000/11(Mar. 6, 2000),
available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/Reg11.pdf; hybrid panels for
prosecutions of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Kosovo, established by
UNMIK Reg. 2000/6 (Feb. 15, 2000), available at http://www.unmikonline
.org/regulations/1000/re2000_06.htm; the Special Court for Sierra Leone, pursuant
to the Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra
Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N.-Sierra
Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/scslagreement.html; and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for
the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic
Kampuchea (Extraordinary Chambers or ECCC), in which the Cambodian
government and the United Nations cooperate under the Agreement between the
United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the
Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of
Democratic Kampuchea (June 6, 2003), available at http://www.unakrtonline.org/Docs/Court%20Documents/ Agreement_between _UN_and_RGC.pdf.
24 See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law
and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, ¶ 12-13, delivered to
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004).
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comprise them? I have identified two characteristics that arise
fairly consistently: (1) short duration postings and (2) socialprofessional networks. Two additional characteristics arise less
consistently but are nonetheless important: (3) narrowly defined
work duties and (4) temporary local networks.
First, internationals (including but not limited to post-conflict
26
justice junkies) seem to stay one and a half to two years on
average in conflict and post-conflict postings. Their stays may
last as long as three years or more, or may be as short as a few
27
months.
This is in part because the contracts offered by
organizations operating in conflict and post-conflict zones are
often short-term. For example, the employees of the Special
Court of Sierra Leone, including the judges and attorneys, are
28
employed on one-year renewable contracts. Similarly, initial
U.N. appointments to special peacekeeping missions are for six
months and thereafter can be renewed for no longer than the
duration of the U.N. mandate, which may be limited to six
29
months or a year. U.S. Foreign Service postings to hardship

25 It is of course impossible to accurately generalize across the disparate national
and institutional settings I am discussing. Thus, I am aware that there are
exceptions and counter-examples to each of the characteristics I describe. I am
making these generalizations nonetheless because I believe that it is useful to focus
upon some frequently recurring characteristics for purposes of understanding the
dynamics that are often at work, so long as one keeps firmly in mind that these
characteristics are not universal. Accordingly, when assessing these generalizations
in any particular context, there may very well be exceptions warranting
modification, deviation from, or abandonment of this model.
26 Throughout this Section, when I refer to “internationals” rather than “postconflict justice junkies,” it is because the available information is for the broader set
of internationals in general, and not specific to post-conflict justice junkies.
27 This is my rough estimate based on my own observations and the data
described below. I do not know of any hard data or empirical studies on this
question.
28 John R.W.D. Jones et al., The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Defence
Perspective, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 211, 223 (2004).
29 U.N.
Peace Operations Recruitment Center Information Sheet,
https://jobs.un.org/Galaxy/Release3/VacancyFM/RecruitmentInfo.html; Telephone
Interview with Anonymous R, (Feb. 14, 2008) [hereinafter R Interview] (contact
information and notes on file with author). A 2001 U.N. audit found that there was
high staff turnover even within the six-month appointment period, comprising in
one instance nine percent of the staff. The Secretary-General, Report of the Office
of Internal Oversight Services on the Audit of the Policies and Procedures of the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations for Recruiting International Civilian Staff
for Field Missions, 13, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/56/202 (July
20, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 Audit].
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posts are typically two-year assignments that can be extended for
30
an additional year.
Another reason for the short stays is that moving to a new
post-conflict zone may present an opportunity for junior staff to
move up in rank and authority quickly. Recruiting personnel to
post-conflict zones can be difficult for international
organizations, particularly amongst the relatively small group of
31
post-conflict justice junkies with legal expertise. Thus, junior
post-conflict justice junkies may abandon a former hot spot
where the upper echelon jobs have all been allotted and flood a
new hot spot where higher ranking opportunities have opened
32
up.
Next, as suggested above in my description of Freetown, postconflict justice junkie networks are not purely professional, but
also social. In each post-conflict setting, internationals form
tight social communities in a relatively insular and privileged
expat culture.
These social communities overlap with,
strengthen, and intensify any immediate working networks that
have formed as well as the broader community of post-conflict
30 E-mail from Tracy Naber, Foreign Service Officer, U.S. State Dept., to Elena
Baylis, Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law (Mar. 6, 2008)
(on file with author).
31 SCOTT N. CARLSON, U.N. PEACEKEEPING BEST PRACTICES REPORTS,
LEGAL AND JUDICIAL RULE OF LAW WORK IN MULTI-DIMENSIONAL
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: LESSONS-LEARNED STUDY 9–11 (2006),
http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/ROL%20Lessons%20Learned%20Report%20%
20March%202006%20FINAL.pdf.
32 The U.N. audit referenced above found that with an authorized staff of 5003 in
all U.N. field missions, the recruitment office processed 4055 appointments in a 22
month period, suggesting extraordinary levels of movement in these offices and
correlating to a rapid expansion of field missions during this period. 2001 Audit,
supra note 29, at 5. The audit also reported that with this rapid expansion of
missions came intense pressure to fill positions with little review of qualifications
and references, suggesting a situation in which junior officers might have
opportunities to move into positions of greater responsibility and prestige by
transferring to new positions in the special peacekeeping missions as they became
available that would otherwise be above their level of experience and expertise. Id.
at 7, 12. In a follow-up audit, it appeared that some U.N. employees were receiving
pay grade increases upon transferring that were greater than they would have been
entitled to otherwise, suggesting an additional incentive to transfer between
missions. The Secretary-General, Follow-up Audit of the Policies and Procedures of
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations for Recruiting International Civilian
Staff for Field Missions, 2, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/152
(July 15, 2004). The estimate of one observer was that staff in U.N. peacekeeping
missions tend to move every one and a half to three years, depending largely on the
availability of opportunities elsewhere. R Interview, supra note 29.
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justice junkies that exists across various post-conflict locations
33
and times.
Furthermore, in any particular post-conflict zone,
internationals may find themselves tasked with mastering a
relatively narrow set of work duties and a correspondingly
narrow set of information relating to those duties. Their
responsibilities may focus upon a particular situation or event
and the associated locations and people; it is these aspects of the
local setting that will accordingly come into relatively detailed
view. For example, there were numerous attorneys working on
each case at the Special Court for Sierra Leone. As such,
attorneys were assigned not just to particular cases, nor even to
individual defendants within that case, but to particular
witnesses relating to particular individual defendants. Thus, they
had become experts in the testimony of those witnesses, rather
than necessarily on the case in general or on Sierra Leone as a
whole. This is not to say that internationals learn nothing
beyond what is strictly required by their work duties. Indeed, I
would be surprised to learn that the attorneys described above
did not, in fact, know a fair amount about the conflict in Sierra
Leone. Rather, I suggest that, as is often true of experts in any
field, internationals tend to develop detailed knowledge of the
particular, at times highly compartmentalized, tasks to which
they are assigned. They develop correspondingly detailed
knowledge of those aspects of the local setting that are relevant
to those tasks without a corresponding level of knowledge of the
setting as a whole.
Although an international’s work duties may be narrow, in at
least some instances that work is facilitated by the development
of temporary local networks focused on particular tasks. In the
DRC, I observed internationals forming shifting partnerships
with international and domestic actors working for institutions
with overlapping mandates in order to deal with particular legal
issues or situations. There was pluralistic participation in dealing
with any given concern, whether proposing legislation,
addressing a mass atrocity, or some other issue. However, I
should note that this does not always seem to be the case. In
Sierra Leone, by contrast, the internationals at the Special Court
appeared to be relatively isolated from other institutions and

33

See also Coles, supra note 4, at 8–9.
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focused entirely upon the cases before them with little input
34
from outside. There did not appear to be a lot of interaction
even with institutions with related mandates, like the Truth and
35
Reconciliation Commission.
These observations are
commensurate with my suggestion elsewhere that hybrid
networks of international and national actors may be more
effective than hybrid courts at promoting productive
36
transnational interaction. However, it is impossible to say, with
such a limited amount of information, whether there is in fact a
correlation here.
In spite of the tentative nature of these observations about
temporary local networks, I raise them here because they
operate as a limit upon my previous claim about the narrowness
of work agendas and because of their implications for the
questions of knowledge that I discuss in the following Section.
In both the DRC and Sierra Leone, those involved were focused
upon particular incidents and issues, and developed expertise in
the related people, laws, and other details. However, in the
DRC, internationals tended to be exposed to a relatively wide
range of contacts through their participation in transnational
networks. While I do not know for certain, one might expect the
knowledge developed in the DRC to reflect a broader variety of
perspectives and thus to be less narrow and focused.
Furthermore, the skills and knowledge that are required to
successfully participate in those shifting local partnerships are
different and more extensive than those that are required to
operate in a singular institutional setting.

34 There is an outreach department at the Special Court, which is tasked with
spreading information about the court and its work to the population as a whole.
This department’s work has been widely praised. However, the outreach
department is not tasked with interacting with the national legal system or
government institutions, nor with bringing information back to the court.
Furthermore, below the managerial level, it is staffed almost entirely by Sierra
Leoneans, not by internationals. David Cohen, “Hybrid” Justice in East Timor,
Sierra Leone, and Cambodia: “Lessons Learned” and Prospects for the Future, 43
STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 21–22 (2007).
35 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) had just issued its report
when I was in Freetown. The Special Court internationals with whom I spoke
expressed a great deal of distress about the TRC’s inclusion of poetry in its report,
which they viewed as disrespectful to the suffering of victims and as evidence of the
TRC’s essential lack of seriousness about its mission.
36 See generally Baylis, Reassessing, supra note 8.
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V
37
“KNOWN KNOWNS”: SIX TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE AND THEIR
POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES
What are the implications of these characteristic patterns of
post-conflict justice junkie behavior for the first question I
posed: What can and do post-conflict justice junkies know? I
have identified six types of knowledge that post-conflict justice
junkies develop and take with them from one post-conflict zone
to the next: analogical, technical, legal, networking, bureaucratic,
and cultural knowledge. The development and transfer of these
forms of knowledge is a notable contribution by post-conflict
justice junkies to post-conflict justice. Nonetheless, as discussed
below, post-conflict justice junkies’ lack of local expertise
represents a fundamental gap in their knowledge that
significantly detracts from their post-conflict justice work.
38

A. Analogical Knowledge

By definition, post-conflict justice junkies have experience
working in multiple post-conflict settings. When they arrive in a
new post-conflict posting, they bring with them their knowledge
of these previous settings, the problems that have arisen, and the
approaches and techniques used there. Upon arrival, they may
be immediately confronted with various needs, often urgent
ones. They see and understand their new situation and its
demands by analogy to those past settings, identifying common
patterns and features, or at least what they believe to be
common patterns and features. New settings thus tend to take
on the shape of previous experiences through the application of
this analogical lens.
This is perhaps the most crucial type of knowledge for
understanding the great strengths of post-conflict justice junkies’
work in post-conflict settings, as well as their Achilles’ heel,
37 “[T]here are known knowns; there are things we know we know.” Hart Seely,
The Poetry of D.H. Rumsfeld: Recent Works by the Secretary of Defense, SLATE,
Apr. 2, 2003, http://www.slate.com/id/2081042/ (quoting Donald Rumsfeld, Dept. of
Defense News Briefing (Feb. 12, 2002)).
38 This is a term that, as far as I can tell, was last used by Thomas Aquinas to
suggest that humans could gain knowledge of God by observing the world. That is
not, as should be obvious, the sense in which I use the phrase, and enough time has
passed since Aquinas’s use was in vogue that I feel comfortable recapturing the
term for my own purposes. See William S. Brewbaker III, Thomas Aquinas and the
Metaphysics of Law, 58 ALA. L. REV. 575, 608 (2007).
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which is discussed at length below. Analogical knowledge is to
no small extent what makes post-conflict justice junkies’
experience in other post-conflict contexts useful to them. It
represents, to invoke an old-fashioned and value-laden term, the
opportunity to develop good judgment. Why so? Because these
layered experiences offer post-conflict justice junkies the chance
to produce a generalized map, symbol set, or tool kit (pick your
metaphor) that they can then use to analyze and understand new
settings by means of example and experience rather than by
abstraction from reason and theory.
Of course, post-conflict justice junkies are not unique in
making use of analogical knowledge. To some extent, everyone
makes use of their previous experiences in understanding and
acting in their present circumstances. What is significant is that
post-conflict justice junkies deliberately, repeatedly immerse
themselves specifically in post-conflict settings.
They are
thereby developing a set of experiences that are likely to be
more relevant as a basis for analogical knowledge in postconflict settings than the average person’s past experiences,
which have typically been formed either in non-conflict settings
or perhaps in a single conflict or post-conflict setting. It is
particularly telling that this sort of deliberate repeated
immersion is the only way of developing such a cache of
knowledge, for one does not typically find oneself repeatedly in
a variety of post-conflict states by sheer chance (or at least, one
would hope not to do so).
The comparative quality of this knowledge is important. One
might expect that the most useful kind of knowledge should be
non-analogical local knowledge, that is, immediate expertise.
Without discounting the enormous value of local expertise, I
contend that analogical knowledge is not merely a second-best
approximate of local knowledge. Rather, it is an independently
useful way of conceptualizing and categorizing experiences that
may permit the importation of insights from other contexts and
the recognition of important connections and dynamics that are
not apparent to those immersed in a given setting. The difficulty
of analogical knowledge is that applying it appropriately is a skill
that requires a delicate touch; as discussed below, if wielded
inappropriately, it can be a blunt and even destructive
instrument.
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Post-conflict justice junkies also convey technical skills and
tools from one post-conflict zone to the next. The example
above, in which a MONUC officer brought knowledge of how to
conduct investigations of mass atrocities from one posting to the
next, is a good example of the rapid transfer of technical
knowledge.
Hearkening back for a moment to my discussion of the legal
literature on knowledge at the outset of this Article, it seems to
me that the importance of technical knowledge tends to be
particularly underestimated in the legal literature. Instead, the
literature privileges intellectual legal knowledge (which is next in
this list) over what are regarded as practical technical skills. This
may represent an understandable professional bias on the part of
academics toward our own knowledge set. This basis is
nonetheless obstructive, for technical skills are at least as
important on the ground for achieving a just result through legal
process as knowledge of legal texts. For example, according to
one of my informants in the DRC, the Congolese police have not
been trained how to carry out investigations. Without the ability
to gather evidence, the police have relied upon obtaining
confessions to resolve cases and, suspects being understandably
reluctant to implicate themselves in the absence of evidence
against them, a great many of those confessions have been
40
obtained by torture. In such a context, informing the police of
the relevant human rights treaties forbidding torture is unlikely
to produce changes in their interrogatory practices. Instead,
MONUC brought in an Australian ex-police officer who runs an
NGO in The Hague to train the Congolese police and MONUC
investigators in legitimate evidence gathering techniques. While
this approach hardly guarantees a change in police practice, it
41
does at least provide a functional alternative.
39 See Haas, supra note 20, at 11–12 (concerning the role of epistemic
communities in conveying technical knowledge).
40 I do not mean to suggest that the use of torture is justified by the lack of
alternative investigative techniques. To the contrary, my position is that it cannot
be justified under any circumstances. I merely claim that the use of torture is both
unsurprising and difficult to change in such a setting.
41 Interview with Anonymous A, Kinshasa, Dem. Rep. Congo (June 20, 2006)
(notes on file with author). I have no information, however, on the success of this
approach.
See also Committee Against Torture, Conclusions and
Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture: Democratic Republic of
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C. Legal Knowledge
This is the form of knowledge that is most familiar and readily
identifiable to lawyers and academics as valuable law-making
knowledge. Post-conflict justice junkies typically know of, have
used, and may bring with them in printed or electronic form
treaties, statutes, case law, and other legal materials. While such
materials are fundamental to legal work, they may not be
available in post-conflict zones. For example, MONUC’s legal
officers are well-versed in the treaties concerning international
criminal law and human rights law. Similarly, MONUC’s
headquarters in Kinshasa has copies of national and
international law and other legal materials, as does the U.S.
embassy library. Such materials are not readily accessible
elsewhere in Kinshasa, where access to the internet and to
published books, cases, and laws is limited.
D. Networking Knowledge
Post-conflict justice junkies have experience operating in
shifting networks whose members are constantly moving and
changing. They also have contacts from their prior missions,
some of whom may be useful either because they also move to
the new setting or because they have information or resources
that can be imported.
E. Bureaucratic Knowledge
Because many post-conflict justice junkies operate within
large and highly bureaucratized institutions like the United
Nations, they are familiar with the routinized processes by which
such organizations function. Such knowledge is necessary to
make progress on any given task within or in coordination with
institutions like the United Nations that often wield considerable
42
power in post-conflict settings.
Post-conflict justice junkies may also be familiar with the
process of developing routinized procedures, and fundamentally,
they are at least cognizant of the possibility of procedures being
Congo, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/DRC/CO/1 (Apr. 1, 2006) (concerning the regular use of
torture by law enforcement personnel in the DRC); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2007: THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (Mar. 11, 2008), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/
rls/hrrpt/2007/100475.htm.
42 See Tolbert & Solomon, supra note 7, at 58.
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routinized rather than a matter of personal discretion.
Bureaucratization is surprisingly important to the development
of rule of law. For example, while I was working in Ethiopia,
one of the major reforms implemented by the Supreme Court
was a color-coded filing system. The President of the Ethiopian
Supreme Court described this to me as a huge step in ending
what he called “a state of corruption.” Previously the filing
system was so complicated and non-transparent that it was
trivially easy for clerks to “lose” files for the proper incentive.
With the file lost, the case could not proceed and might be
stalled indefinitely. Color-coded filing made the system so
transparent that files could not be easily “lost.” What had been
an act of personal volition (searching for and finding a file upon
request) became a bureaucratic act (pulling the file from its
known location) that was both mundane and, crucially,
43
achievable without the exercise of any discretion whatsoever.
F. Cultural Knowledge
Post-conflict justice junkies are immersed in expat culture,
human rights culture, and democracy-building culture, and
44
should be adept in operating in these cultures. International
institutions play an important role in post-conflict zones, and
these institutions are typically staffed by expats who are at least
to some extent committed to the aims of promoting human
rights and democracy. Accordingly, this cultural knowledge is
also crucial to interacting successfully with those institutions in
post-conflict contexts.
Post-conflict justice junkies develop these six kinds of
knowledge through their work in post-conflict settings and
convey them from one setting to another when they tribunalhop. This has two positive consequences. The first is the quick
spread of useful information from one place to another. This is
particularly important in post-conflict contexts, where other
mechanisms for the conveyance of information (e.g.,

43 Kemal Bedri & Elena Baylis, Constructing Credibility, 6 GREEN BAG 399, 403–
04 (2003).
44 See Glen H. Fisher, The Foreign Service Officer, 368 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 71, 75–76 (1966) (describing the “third culture” of the “foreign
multinational diplomatic community”); see also Jean-Klein & Riles, supra note 5
(international human rights law culture).
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publications, the internet, media, modeling by functioning
domestic institutions, or training) are not likely to be functional.
The second positive consequence is the gradual development
45
of what amounts to a corps of post-conflict justice experts.
Importantly, this corps is relatively junior and is willing and
often eager to move to new hot spots, unlike judges and other
senior personnel whose expertise is sought in post-conflict
settings. As I have argued elsewhere, the goals of post-conflict
justice may more readily be achieved by deploying junior
personnel with the experience and skills to successfully work in
chaotic post-conflict settings than by deploying senior personnel
who have greater rank and subject-matter expertise, but who
46
lack post-conflict experience and skills.
Many of these six types of knowledge are created through
post-conflict justice junkies’ immersion in post-conflict settings
and institutions (i.e., cultural knowledge, legal and technical
knowledge to some extent, and in some instances bureaucratic
knowledge), and some require immersion in multiple settings to
be fully developed (i.e., analogical knowledge and, to some
extent, networking knowledge). The post-conflict justice junkie
itinerant lifestyle of tribunal-hopping is therefore not merely
incidental to, but constructive of, these forms of knowledge.
VI
47
“KNOWN UNKNOWNS”: WHAT POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE
JUNKIES DON’T KNOW
What, on the other hand, do post-conflict justice junkies not
know? Most importantly, they don’t tend to know much about
48
the particular situation they are in, and so they tend to fill in the
blanks in creative but not necessarily accurate or useful ways.
This is the Achilles’ heel of analogical knowledge: the analogy is
45 Such expertise is crucial to Haas’ definition of an epistemic community, along
with “a set of principled and causal beliefs[,] . . . shared notions of validity and a
shared policy enterprise.” See Haas, supra note 20, at 16.
46 See Baylis, Reassessing, supra note 8, § II.D.2.a: Legal Pluralism.
47 “We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are
some things we do not know.” Seely, supra note 37 (quoting Donald Rumsfeld,
Dept. of Defense News Briefing (Feb. 12, 2002)).
48 This is, as suggested above, a point made by others studying the work of
internationals in particular post-conflict contexts. It is not, however, either a
universally shared perspective or a universal truth. See Louis Aucoin, The Role of
International Experts in Constitution-Making, 5 GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 89, 94–95 (2004).
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not always apt. To offer a metaphor of my own, like the old New
Yorker cover featuring a New York resident’s distorted view of
49
the world shaped by its focus on New York City, post-conflict
justice junkies’ use of familiar contexts to understand an
unfamiliar situation can have a distorting effect on their
understanding. Aspects of a new setting that are like places they
have been before loom large in their view, tasks that are
achievable with the tools they bring with them come into sharp
focus, and other characteristics and needs either recede into
nothingness or are reshaped to fit this prior knowledge.
Others have noted that internationals typically lack local
knowledge of post-conflict settings, whether that is knowledge of
the local legal system, local facts, local culture, or any other
relevant local information. This is indeed a pervasive and, at
times, crippling problem. The solution that is typically offered is
50
that internationals should acquire more local knowledge. That
is certainly a good idea in the abstract, however, I contend that
this lack of local knowledge is an inevitable consequence of the
structure of international interventions.
While some
improvements in post-conflict justice junkies’ local knowledge
could be made on the margins, any real remediation of this
problem is unachievable without revamping the entire
institutional and political structure of international interventions
or ceasing international interventions altogether–both highly
unlikely prospects. I identify the following structural elements
that prevent the acquisition of local knowledge: lack of time,
false expertise, and complexity and size.
A. Lack of Time
When people work in a place for a short stint, as post-conflict
justice junkies virtually always do, they lack the opportunity and
incentive to develop much local knowledge. During one of my
visits to Kosovo, I spoke to an American judge who was serving
on a hybrid international-national panel in Kosovo for one year.
He was a state court judge in the United States and was coming

49 Saul Steinberg, View of the World from 9th Avenue, NEW YORKER, Mar. 29,
1976, available at http://strangemaps.wordpress.com/2007/02/07/72-the-world-asseen-from-new-yorks-9th-avenue/.
50 E.g., Brooks, supra note 5, at 2334–37.
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to the end of his year in Kosovo when we spoke. During our
conversation, he criticized certain elements of Kosovo’s legal
system as being holdovers from the communist era in
Yugoslavia, when in fact they were ordinary aspects of many
civil law systems, such as the use of judges in an investigative
role. Such basic misunderstandings will inevitably arise in short
visits to foreign settings, and moreover, they will inevitably arise
repeatedly if an institution is continuously staffed with shortterm international visitors. The initial problem of unfamiliarity
with a local context is exacerbated by the lack of incentive to
develop a deep understanding if one knows that one will move
on in a short period of time to a new setting where this
knowledge will not be directly useful.
As important as recognizing that short-term work has a
detrimental effect on local knowledge (an unsurprising
conclusion, to be sure) is the realization that the short-term
nature of this work is not a happenstance, but part and parcel of
the international system for intervening in post-conflict areas.
The United Nations, NGOs, and other international institutions
typically have only short-term commitments in such places.
While these commitments may be repeatedly extended, as for
example U.N. mandates frequently are, institutions nonetheless
cannot offer their employees and contractors commitments that
are longer than their own. Thus, as discussed above, the United
Nations, NGOs, and the foreign service branches of
governments typically offer short-term contracts or postings to
conflict and post-conflict zones. These policies are tied to the
realities of political authorization for involvement, of funding
sources and limitations, and in the case of foreign service
agencies, to longstanding beliefs about the necessity of
periodically moving staff. These beliefs and realities are not
likely to change. Unless the international community decides to
stop intervening in new post-conflict zones, new opportunities
will continue to open up for such work, and unless the
international community develops a new willingness to maintain

51 I would not categorize this judge as a post-conflict justice junkie but rather as
an international, as his work in Kosovo seemed to be a one-off; however, his
experience is nonetheless representative of the general phenomenon of short-term
work that is common to post-conflict justice junkies as well.
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long-term administrations in troubled regions, old opportunities
52
will continue to close.
Furthermore, as discussed above, the short-term nature of this
work is also intrinsically linked to the formation and conveyance
of other forms of knowledge from place to place. If post-conflict
justice junkies were to stay in one post-conflict location for five
to ten years rather than one and a half to two on average, it
would take substantially longer for the technical skills and other
types of knowledge discussed above to be transferred from one
place to another.
B. False Expertise
The corps of experts I mentioned above is not yet that large
and people with no real expertise in areas that matter, like
international criminal law, may be and have been deemed
experts merely because they are foreigners with expertise in
some area of the law. The risk of false experts is particularly
high because the corps is weighted toward junior personnel.
Junior post-conflict justice junkies appear to be far more
numerous than their senior counterparts, but because they
necessarily have limited experience at such an early stage in their
careers, calling especially the most junior of them “experts” may
stretch the meaning of the term too far.
At the senior level, true subject matter experts are both fewer
in number and less likely to be interested in going to conflict
zones. This has been a particular problem for hybrid tribunals,
which rely upon foreign judges to participate in mixed
international-national panels. There are very few judges with
expertise in international criminal law, much less in trials for
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, and even
fewer who are willing to travel to post-conflict settings. The
American state court judge I mentioned above very likely was an
expert in state law and in the kinds of cases he had heard in the
course of his pre-Kosovo career, but he was certainly not an

52 For example, there has been great pressure upon the ICTY and the ICTR to
bring their trials to an end, even though each court still had a number of defendants
remaining when this pressure began. Of course, the handful of cases that each court
has handled is itself dwarfed by the number of possible cases and defendants. Thus,
the courts’ work had not come to any logical or obvious conclusion. Rather, it was
the patience of the international community for this work, and its willingness to
continue to commit financial and human resources to it, that had reached its end.
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expert in international criminal law, civil law, Kosovo’s law, or
the kinds of cases that he was hearing in Kosovo.
C. Complexity and Size
Within each post-conflict setting, there may be multiple ethnic
groups, multiple languages, multiple governments and legal
systems in operation, multiple histories, and all kinds of logistical
difficulties in going to, and learning about, each of these
communities and systems. In the DRC, for example, there are
250 ethnic groups. The country is the size of the United States
east of the Mississippi and has less than 300 miles of paved road.
The only way to get around the country is by plane, and one
literally takes one’s life into one’s hands by doing so, for the
53
DRC has one of the worst airline safety records in the world.
Unsurprisingly, there is no information available about what is
going on in many isolated regions of the country. A few NGOs
have sent out teams to investigate local justice problems and
solutions in the eastern regions, but this mapping is extremely
limited in space and time. Additionally, this information may be
of limited utility in such a dynamic situation where the facts on
the ground may change before they can be incorporated into a
comprehensive report. Furthermore, with widely disparate
conditions on the ground, investigators cannot accurately
generalize from one or two examples to the whole.
There are a number of unfortunate tendencies that may result
from post-conflict justice junkies’ lack of local knowledge. In my
experience, three such tendencies are (1) the tendency to
overreach and to simply deploy the tools and knowledge
available, regardless of whether they are appropriate for the
situation; (2) the tendency to treat one’s lack of knowledge as
actual terra nullius and to behave as if there is no law or quasilegal process in operation if one does not know of it; and (3) the
tendency to co-opt transitional justice cases, that is, to channel as
much as possible into the international venues that are well
known by the post-conflict justice junkie and away from
54
unknown domestic settings.
53 Reuters, Congolese Airline Claims Most Passengers Survived Crash, HERALD
SUN (Melbourne, Austl.), Apr. 16, 2008, http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/
0,21985,23548004-663,00.html.
54 As for this last point, there are numerous substantive critiques of national
courts. E.g., Laura A. Dickinson, Notes and Comments, The Promise of Hybrid
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However, it is important to remember that there are limits on
the effects of these “known unknowns” and the resulting
tendencies I have outlined. International institutions are not
hegemonic in post-conflict settings and post-conflict justice
junkies’ lack of knowledge correlates to some extent with a lack
of power. International influence is often strong where it
intrudes, but there are many places where it does not intrude at
all. In some instances these limits on international power are
quite literally physical ones. For example, when I visited Sierra
Leone, the Special Court’s international presence was
concentrated in the capital, Freetown. Mobility was particularly
limited during the rainy season, when many of the roads became
untraversable. As a consequence, the court was using radio
reports to extend its reach as much as possible into rural areas.
Similarly, in the DRC, the lack of transportation infrastructure
makes it extremely difficult to travel from place to place. There
are U.N. troops on the ground in the capital and in select
locations elsewhere in the country. NGOs, U.N. officers, and
others are similarly concentrated in Kinshasa and scattered
elsewhere here and there, but there are vast regions of the
country where international presence and influence are
occasional at best.
In other instances, limits on international influence are legal,
social, and political, rather than geographical. Where domestic
institutions hold authority and exercise control, internationals
may be limited to playing a supporting role. However, this is not
a given in post-conflict settings. Here, contrast the situation in
the DRC, which is under domestic rule, with that of Kosovo
during the period of U.N. administration. In the DRC, the
United Nations, NGOs, and foreign embassies have been
occupied with supporting national trials and proposing
legislation to the national parliament. In Kosovo, on the other
hand, the Special Representative of the Secretary General
exercised authority superior to all Provisional Institutions of
55
Self-Governance.
Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 300–05 (2003). I do not mean by identifying this
tendency to suggest that such critiques are subsumed by this preference for the
known over the unknown. Rather, I contend that this tendency reinforces and
complements the preference for the international that is also founded in part on
substantive concerns.
55 See Baylis, Reassessing, supra note 8, § II.C.4: Networks of International
Organizations, Networks, and Others; U.N. Mission in Kosovo, On the Law
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VII
CONCLUSIONS
A. On Local Knowledge
First, I should reaffirm that the acquisition of local knowledge
ought to be a critical aspect of international involvement in postconflict settings. By examining the knowledge-creating and
knowledge-conveying functions of tribunal-hopping, I do not
mean to diminish the significance of the problems posed by
intervening internationals’ lack of local knowledge, problems
which I consider to be both pervasive and of grave importance.
However, while I believe that intervening internationals
should acquire local knowledge, I am skeptical that the postconflict justice junkie subset will in fact acquire such knowledge
on anything but a sporadic basis due to the countervailing
incentives and structure of international interventions described
above. Accordingly, instead of reiterating the calls for postconflict justice junkies to learn more about the local settings in
which they work, I offer three suggestions for mitigating the
negative effects of post-conflict justice junkies’ lack of local
knowledge.
1. Acknowledge the “Unknown Unknowns”

56

As Donald Rumsfeld has sagely noted, we should “know
57
there are some things we do not know.” In this context, that
means that post-conflict justice junkies should actively recognize
that the limits of their own knowledge do not reflect the limits of
reality and that, to the contrary, upon entering new contexts
there is in fact very little relationship between the actions of
which they happen to become aware and the total scope of
relevant activities taking place. Rather than presuming their
analogical knowledge to be apt and blinding themselves to those
aspects of their current situation that do not match their
expectations, they should be prepared to stumble upon processes

Applicable in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/59 (Oct. 27, 2000); see also
Aucoin, supra note 48, at 94–95.
56 “But there are also unknown unknowns–the ones we don’t know we don’t
know.” Seely, supra note 37 (quoting Donald Rumsfeld, Dept. of Defense News
Briefing (Feb. 12, 2002)).
57 Id.
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and dynamics that are completely different than those
encountered before.
2. Scale Back Expectations and Efforts at Control
The goals of post-conflict justice are lofty: end impunity,
promote reconciliation, achieve accountability, and so on. These
goals are also ultimately contingent on factors outside postconflict justice junkies’ control. Actively striving toward such
unachievable goals tempts post-conflict justice junkies to make
more of their local knowledge than there is to it and to
overextend their reach in deploying their analogical knowledge
in an attempt to understand, and thus to contain and control,
local settings. I suggested in a recent article that rather than
attempting to control atrocity trials by holding them in
international courts or hybrid courts controlled by international
judges, the international community should support and
58
Like scaling back
facilitate trials in national courts.
expectations, scaling back efforts at control and instead playing a
supporting role will reduce the temptation to expansively
interpret the scope of one’s local knowledge. It may also
provide opportunities to more effectively use other kinds of
knowledge that post-conflict justice junkies may have in spades,
such as technical, legal, and bureaucratic knowledge.
3. Focus on Areas of Technical, Legal, Bureaucratic, and Other
59
Expertise
Concomitantly,
post-conflict
justice
junkies
should
affirmatively identify areas where they can offer “value added”
through the conveyance of particular knowledge and skills. The
need for police training in the DRC is an excellent example of
this. So is the transfer and application of specific legal
knowledge (treaties, case law, and so on), and the very careful
use of analogical knowledge.
B. Restoring Dignity to the Post-Conflict Justice Junkies
Beyond these pragmatic suggestions for ameliorating the oftacknowledged problem that internationals in general and post-

See generally Baylis, Reassessing, supra note 8.
See Tolbert & Solomon, supra note 7, at 57–61 (taking a similar approach to
their proposals for reform of U.N. involvement in rule of law development).
58
59
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conflict justice junkies in particular are neither domestic actors
nor typically well-versed in domestic settings, I have several
observations drawn from the discussion above. In this Article, I
have at times described internationals and their pursuit of postconflict justice in fairly flippant terms. Certainly the contrast
between international and local lifestyles described at the outset
of this Article provides ample material for such remarks.
But my conclusions concerning the post-conflict justice
junkies should restore their dignity, at least to some extent, by
contending that there is at least some utility and productivity to
their tribunal-hopping habits. While I agree with previous
commentators’ observations concerning the detrimental effects
of post-conflict justice junkies’ lack of local knowledge, I argue
that they also bring to each new post-conflict setting other forms
of knowledge that contribute to their post-conflict justice work.
Furthermore, I contend that these forms of knowledge are in no
small part formed by their repeated, swift immersion in
consecutive post-conflict settings. I also hope to defend postconflict justice junkies’ good character by noting that their
tribunal-hopping ways and their corresponding lack of local
knowledge are produced by the structural elements of
international interventions. In moving so quickly from place to
place, post-conflict justice junkies are responding rationally to
the incentive structure created by international organizations
rather than being driven solely by whims of their own.
Fundamentally, I argue that law-making knowledge, like lawmaking process, is broader than we have previously recognized,
and includes not just legal knowledge but also analogical,
technical, bureaucratic, and other forms of knowledge that
contribute to post-conflict justice’s extralegal goals.
Furthermore, law-making knowledge inheres in and is
transferred by individuals, albeit individuals operating within
larger institutions and epistemic communities or networks. It is
of course not practical to analyze these individuals one by one,
but it is useful to recognize that if we had the time, energy,
resources, and patience, that might be the proper way to go
about understanding the development of post-conflict justice as
we know it.

